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Introduction
The vision of a naya (new) Pakistan enunciated by Prime Minister Imran 
Khan, Chairman of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) Party, faces 
seemingly insurmountable challenges. The new government has inherited 
poor relations with India, continuing conflict along the Af-Pak border, 
intractable internal security challenges, a failing economy, with a huge 
external debt and a steady souring of relations with the US. It also faces 
the possibility of a dent in its relations with China.
By accommodating and promoting the geo-strategic interests of China 
and the United States in Southern Asia over several decades, Pakistan made 
itself virtually indispensable to both. However, the Trump Administration 
is unwilling to countenance the Pakistan Army’s doublespeak and has 
drastically curtailed military aid. And, in a bearhug which the Pakistanis 
did not see coming, China has entangled the country in a web of debt 
through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).1 China intends 
to make the CPEC the flagship project of its ambitious ‘Belt and Road 
Initiative’ (BRI) for the geo-political and economic domination of Asia.
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Pakistan-China Relations and CPEC
The China-Pakistan relationship, called an “all-weather friendship”, has 
been variously described as “higher than the mountains, deeper than the 
oceans, stronger than steel and sweeter than honey”. China has provided 
nuclear warhead technology and ballistic missiles to Pakistan. The two 
countries also have a close relationship in jointly manufacturing military 
hardware, including fighter aircraft and main battle tanks. Pakistan’s support 
has been a major factor in China’s quest for the strategic encirclement 
of India. The relations between the two have deepened further with the 
CPEC beginning to take shape even though apprehensions are emerging 
regarding the feasibility and likely benefits from the project. 
Passing through disputed territory in Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan 
occupied Kashmir (PoK), the US$ 62 billion CPEC project will link 
Xinjiang province of China with Gwadar port on the Makran coast 
west of Karachi. However, doubts have been expressed regarding the 
economic viability of using Gwadar as a warm water port by mainland 
China. Funds for this ambitious project will be provided by China both 
through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and by way of 
direct government-to-government soft loans. 
To help it to recover its capital investment in the Gwadar port complex, 
for example, China will get 91 per cent share of the revenue from the 
operations of the port and the terminal, and 85 per cent of the revenue 
generated by the free zone.2 Under this arrangement, though the port is 
expected to handle one million tonnes of cargo annually, the impression 
in Pakistan is that the benefits will accrue mainly to the Chinese. Also, 
there are misgivings within Pakistan regarding the debt trap that the huge 
investment in the CPEC will result in. The Pakistani elite are no doubt 
watching the disaster that the developments in Hambantota port and 
international airport have been for Sri Lanka. (China has taken over de 
facto possession of the port and the airport at Hambantota as Sri Lanka is 
unable to repay its debt.)
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Resentment Against CPEC in Balochistan
Balochistan is Pakistan’s largest province, but has the lowest population 
(13 million) and is the least developed. For over six decades, Pakistan 
has extensively exploited the rich mineral resources of Balochistan. The 
Government of Pakistan does not pay Balochistan any royalty or give it 
what it considers its due share of the revenues generated from the mines.3 
Due to the lack of transmission lines, electric supply to Balochistan is the 
lowest of all the provinces. 
China is also extremely concerned about the safety and security of 
its workers engaged in construction work in the CPEC projects. Baloch 
independence movements have made it clear several times that they will 
not abandon their people’s future in the name of development projects 
or even democracy. Chinese workers have also been targeted.4 Three 
Chinese workers were injured in an attack in Balochistan on August 11, 
2018. 
Though Pakistan is raising a Special Security Division comprising 
approximately 15,000 personnel to provide security for the CPEC against 
terrorist attacks, the construction of a dam by the Chinese in Gilgit-
Baltistan has shown that eventually People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
soldiers are inducted for this purpose.5 The presence of PLA personnel in 
Pakistan in large numbers will further vitiate the security environment in 
South Asia.
Pressure on Pakistan to Act Against the Taliban
US and Pakistani interests coincided during the war against Communism 
and Pakistan was invited to join both the Central Treaty Organisation 
(CENTO) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). Pakistan 
was instrumental in facilitating the initial approach in America’s policy to 
open up to China. The US has been a major supplier of modern weapons 
and military equipment to Pakistan, including the F-16 fighter aircraft. 
These were provided ostensibly for counter-insurgency operations and to 
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support the Pakistan Army to maintain stability against a jihadi takeover 
of the country. In the last decades, military aid was also given to encourage 
Pakistan to act against the Afghan Taliban. However, Pakistan failed to 
act decisively. 
As had been widely anticipated, President Trump put Pakistan on 
notice for encouraging terrorist organisations to destabilise neighbouring 
countries. He blamed Pakistan for harbouring “safe havens for terrorist 
organisations, the Taliban, and other groups that pose a threat to the 
region and beyond.” Trump told Pakistan that it has “much to gain” 
from partnering with the US, but also warned the country that “it has 
much to lose by continuing to harbour criminals and terrorists.” The US 
has provided security assistance worth approximately US$ 33 billion to 
Pakistan since 2002. In the budget for 2018, this has been reduced to US$ 
150 million. Most recently, the US has drastically cut the participation 
of Pakistani officers in training programmes. Also, the US has warned 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) not to approve a new bailout 
package Pakistan as the new loans will be used to repay the Chinese debt. 
Estrangement with the US is likely to further propel Pakistan into the 
Chinese arms. Russia too is waiting in the wings to exploit the emerging 
situation to its advantage. It has begun to provide military equipment 
to Pakistan and has even offered to train Pakistani officers to fill the gap 
created by the restrictions imposed by the Pentagon. Iran, which too is 
facing tougher US sanctions, has invited Pakistan to join hands for the 
development of Chabahar port to provide a new route to Afghanistan 
and the Central Asian Republics – a project in it has which a major stake. 
Collective Security 
In China’s plans for the CPEC and hegemony in Asia, Gwadar is an 
important foothold that is part of its ‘string of pearls’ strategy for the 
Indo-Pacific. If Gwadar port is converted into a naval base some time 
in the future, it will enable the PLA Navy to maintain a permanent 
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presence in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman. Both China and 
Pakistan view the development of Gwadar port as a ‘win-win’ situation.6
However, the new challenge posed by China in the Indo-Pacific is 
unlikely to go uncontested. The US has renamed the Pacific Command 
as the Indo-Pacific Command. In November 2017, senior officials of 
Australia, India, Japan and the US, meeting on the sidelines of the East 
Asia Summit in the Philippines, agreed that a “free, open, prosperous 
and inclusive Indo-Pacific region serves the long-term interests of all 
countries in the region and of the world at large”.7 This development 
led to speculation that the idea of a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (also 
called the QUAD) is being revived after a hiatus of ten years. Though 
India does not at present favour a formal security arrangement, the 
QUAD’s discussions for cooperative security are likely to eventually lead 
to strategic realignment for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.
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